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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
Bo:NXYE V. HooPER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GExERAL "JioTORS CoRPORATioN, 
Defen&ant and Respondent, 
Civil No. 7887 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Bonnye V. Hooper, plaintiff and appellant herein, 
and her son, Beverly H.ooper, purchased a new model 
1951, Chevrolet pickup truck from the Hyland Motor 
Company in Ely, Nevada, on July 21, 1951. The truck 
was manufactured and assembled by General Motors 
Corporation, defendant and respondent, herein, and was 
sold by respondent to the Hyland Motor Company, one of 
respondent's dealers (R. 254, 255 ). 
The left rear wheel on the truck was defectively 
manufactured. On October 15, 1951, while appellant 
wa~ driving the truck, the defective wheel failed causing 
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the truck to overturn and resulting in serious injuries 
to appellant. 
From a verdict and judgment in favor of General 
Motors Corporation ~ppellant, Bonnye V. Hooper, 
appeals. 
POINTS ARGUED BY APPELLANT 
1. The trial court's Instruction No. 6 was preju-
dicial error. 
2. The trial court erred in admitting opinion evi-
dence of Mr. Arthur Harris on the ultimate fact in issue. 
3. The trial court erred in admitting the hearsay 
testimony of Mr. Lowell G. Fouts. 
4. The trial court erred in admitting the specula-
tive testimony of Mr. Arthur Harris. 
STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE 
The plaintiff and appellant is a resident of White 
Pine County, Nevada. She and her son, Beverly U. 
Hooper, as partners own and operate a cattle ranch in 
Newark Valley, White Pine County, Nevada. (R. 120) 
U.S. Highway No. 50 is a paved highway running 
in an easterly and westerly direction between Eureka, 
Nevada, and Ely, Nevada. The Newark Valley High-
way is a gravelled road that runs in a northerly and ~ 
southerly direction and intersects U.S. Highway No. 
50 on the north side thereof at a point approximately ~ 
14 miles east of Eureka, Nevada. At the intersection ~ 
of the two highways there is a club and bar known as 
the El Dorado Club. The Hooper ranch is located 23 
miles north of the intersection on the Newark Valley 
Highway. 
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On July :.:!1, 1951, appellant and her son purchased 
a new model 1951 Chevrolet pickup truck from the 
Hyland ~Iotor Company in Ely, Nevada. The truck 
was purchased for ranch use. (R. 56, 57, 120) Hyland 
:\lotor Company purchased the truck from General 
:\Iotors Corporation, defendant and respondent, at whole-
sale and sold it to appellant and her son at retail. Re-
spondent manufactured and assembled the truck. The 
left rear wheel on said truck was manufactured by 
the X orris Thern1ador Corporation and was assembled 
and placed on the truck by respondent. (R. 254, 255) 
On October 15, 1951, appellant left the ranch in the 
truck at approximately 6:05 p.m. She was going to Eu-
reka, X eYada, to attend a lodge meeting and to attend to 
some ranch business (R. 121). Appellant was alone in 
the truck (R. 121). Appellant was driving the truck at 
about 30 miles per hour in a southerly direction on the 
Xewark Valley Highway and, when she reached a point 
approximately six or seven miles north of the said inter-
section, the left rear end of the truck suddenly dropped ~ 
down. The truck then swerved to the left; and, when 
appellant tried to turn it back to the right, it tipped 
over in such a manner that it went over the right front 
fender, on over on top of the cab and down on its left 
side. (R. 122) The truck skidded for several feet on 
its left side. When it came to rest, it was lying on its 
left side facing in a northv,~esterly direction on the 
surface of the gravelled highway (R. 257, 260). The 
left do of was sprung completely open. ( R. 123, 126, 127) 
Appellant'~ right foot and leg were pinned between 
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the upper rear portion of the cab of the truck and the 
gravelled road The olitside of appellant's right foot and 
leg were lying next to the cab and the inside of her 
right foot and leg were lying on the gravelled road. 
( R. 123, 124, 125) 
The accident occurred between 6 :30 p.m. and 6:45 
p.m. on October 15, 1951 (R. 126). Appellant lay pinned 
under the truck from then until help arrived, which 
was over an hour after the accident. 
The first person to arrive at the scene was Mrs. 
Jim Stinnett (R. 126}. She immediately went for help.. 
Jim Stinnett, Dan Milovich and two other men went to 
the scene upon being notified of the accident by Mrs. 
Stinnett. When they arrived at the scene of the acci-
dent, they lifted the truck onto its wheels, put appel-
lant in Dan Milovich 's automobile and took her to the 
El Dorado Club where an ambulance was called to take 
her to Ely, Nevada. (R. 128, 129, 130) 
As a result of the accident appellant received very 
serious permanent injuries. Her right foot was about 
two-thirds amputated. She suffered a compound com-
minuted fracture of the right tibia (shin bone) and 
fibula. The right tibia and fibula were badly splintered 
and serious damage to the right astragulus (foot bone) 
and the right ankle joint was sustained. The left ankle 
bone was fractured, a right upper tooth knocked out and 
both legs were severely bruised. (R. 166 to 175, 243, 247, 
248, 249) 
Appellant was in the hospital from October 15, 1951, 
until February 11, 1952. ·~ 
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It is the opinion of the doctors that Mrs. Hooper's 
right leg "ill ultimately have to be amputated mid-
way between the ankle and knee. Even if the right 
leg is saved, and in the opinion of the doctors there 
is only one in ten chances of saving it, the right leg 
will be about an inch shorter than the left leg and the 
ankle "ill be permanently stiff. Whether the right foot 
is saved or amputated, nirs. Hooper will ·be limited 
so far as engaging in her occupation as a rancher and 
carrying on her ranch activities by about 75% for the 
rest of her life. (R. 171 to 174, 247, 248, 249) 
At the time of the accident the truck was less than 
three months old. It had been driven approximately 
6,700 miles (R. 82). 
The left rear wheel of the truck consists of a 
"spider" and a "rim." The spider is the center part 
of the wheel that bolts to the hub or drum of the axle. 
The rim is that part of the wheel on which the tire is 
mounted. The rim is attached to the spider by rivets. 
The spider; Exhibit "A", and the rim, Exhibit "B", 
were found in a completely separated condition after 
the accident. The spider, Exhibit "A", was still bolted 
to the left rear hub of the truck. The tire, Exhibit "C ", 
was flat and was still mounted on the rim, Exhibit "B ". 
The rim had come loose from the spider, had completely 
separated therefrom and was lying on the ground after 
the accident. (R. 63, 64, 65, 66, 152, 153, 164, 165, 264, 
265, 272) 
Dan ~Iilovich, a witness for appellant, testified that 
immediatPl~~ after the accident the spider, Exhibit ''A'', 
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and the rim, Exhibit "B", were found in a completely 
separated condition. (R. 152, 153, 164, 165) Mr. Jim 
. Stinnett, a witness for respondent, testified that imme-
diately after the accident the spider, Exhibit "A", and 
the rim, Exhibit "B", were found in a completely 
separated condition. (R. 264, 265, 272) 
There was a 0onflict in the evidence as to whether 
or not the left rear wheel of the truck was defective 
and as to whether or not the defect caused the acci-
dent and injuries in question. 
There are twelve rivet holes in the rim. For iden-
tification purposes, the valve stem hole in the rim is 
placed up, and the rivet role immediately below the valve 
stem hole is number 12. The rivet hole next to the 
valve stem hole in a clockwise direction is number 1, 
the next one number 2 and so on around to number 12. 
An examination of the rim, Exhibit "B" imme-
diately after the accident revealed that the rim on the 
under side near rivet holes number 1, 2, 3 and 4 was 
shiny and worn (R. 66, 67). Mr. David H. Curtis, expert 
witness for appellant, testified that the sm·oothness and 
wear had taken place over a considerable length of 
time prior to failure of the wheel (R. 184, 185). He 
testified that this wear showed there had been loose 
rivets in holes numbered 1, 2 and 3 prior to failure 
of the wheel and the resulting accident, and that this 
looseness would have permitted movement between the 
spider, Exhibit "A", and the rim, Exhibit "B'', and 
also would have permitted vibration and oscillation 
qetween the two component parts as the truck was 
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being driven (R. 183 ) .. Mr. Curtis further testified that 
three loose riYets in an otherwise normal wheel of the 
type represented by Exhibits '"A" and "B" would 
cause an ultin1ate failure of the entire wheel (R. 185, 
186). He further testified that the reasons it would 
cause such a failure are: 1. that loos.eness of three 
rivets would cause a shifting of the load to the other 
rivets which could result in an ultimate failure of the 
wheel, and :2. that looseness in the rivets would cause 
a vibration or oscillation which could cause the other 
rivets to fatigue and fail ( R. 185, 186). 
~Ir. Arthur Harris, an employee of and an expert 
witness for respondent, testified that in his opinion 
the separation of the spider and rim as represented 
by Exhibits "A" and "B" was caused by an extremely 
heavy blow being struck on the outer rim which caused 
the spider to distort and then shear the rivets (R. 
362, 363). 
ARGU~IENT 
PorNT 1. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
The trial court instructed the jury as f.ollows : 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 (R. 36) 
(Same instruction as respondent's requested instruction 
No. 3, R. 19). 
"You are instructed that the fact that the rim 
and spider were found in a separated condition 
after the accident is no evidence of the fact that 
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they were defective, unsound or unsafe when 
assembled and sold by defendant, General Motors 
Corporation, nor is it evidence of the fact that 
the separating of the rim and spider caused the 
truck to go out of control and over turn." 
The effect of this instruction is to remove completely 
from the consideration of the jury, the evidence that the 
spider, Exhibit "A", and the rim, Exhibit "B", were 
found cmnpletely separated after the accident. The in-
struction is a declaration by the trial eourt, that as a 
matter of law, the jury must not consider the fact of 
such separation on the issue of defective manufacture 
and on the issue of causation. 
To point up the vice of this instruction we must 
look briefly at the evidence on the issue of defective 
manufacture and on the issue of whether the separation 
of the spider and rim caused the truck to overturn 
which resulted in appellant's injuries. 
Appellant's evidence on these two issues was: 
1. The fact that the spider, Exhibit" A" and 
the rim, Exhibit '' B' ', were found in a completely 
separated condition after the accident (R. 63, 64, 
65, 66, 152, 153, 164, 165, 264, 265, 272). 
2. That worn shiny spots appeared on the 
rim, Exhibit "B ", on the under side of rivet 
holes numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4 (R. 66, 67, 184, 185). 
3. Expert testimony to the effect that the 
smoothness and wear had taken place over a con-
siderable length of time prior to the ultimate 
failure of the wheel; that such wear showed there 
had been loose rivets in holes numbered 1, 2 
and 3 prior to failure of the wheel and the result-
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ing accident; that this looseness would have per-
nutted movement between the spider, Exhibit 
""A", and the rim, Exhibit "B", and would also 
have permitted vibration and oscillation between 
the two component parts; that three such loose 
riYets would cause an ultimate failure of the wheel 
( R. 184, 185, 186). 
4. The truck was less than three months old 
and had been driven only 6, 700 miles ( R. 56, 57, 
82). 
5. That there had been no prior damage to 
the left rear wheel of the truck (See Exhibit 
"S ", R. 42, 67, 81, 82 to 86, 91, 92, 113, 239, 240, 
241). 
' 
6. That the first indication that anything was 
wrong just prior to the accident was that the 
left rear end of the truck suddenly dropped down. 
The truck then swerved to the left and, when 
turned back to the right, it tipped over (R. 122, 
123). 
7. That an automobile 'track at the scene of 
the accident swerved to the left out onto the 
shoulder of the road and back slightly to the 
right (R. 79, 80, 151, 152, 177, 178, Exhibit "7"). 
Respondent's evidence was in conflict with that of 
appellant's and attempted to show that the wheel was 
not defective and that the separation of the spider and 
rim was caused by a heavy blow being struck on the rim 
(R. 362, 363). 
1. DEFECTIVE MANUFACTURE. 
Instruction No. 6, i11 effect, told the jury, that it 
eould not consider, and that it must disregard completely, 
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the fact that the rim and the spider separated and were 
found in that condition after the accident (R. 36). 
The fact that the rim and spider were found in a 
separated condition after the accident was relevant on 
the issue ·of defective manufacture. The fact of such 
separation, when considered with all the other circum-
stances, tended to prove that the wheel was defectively 
manufactured. The other evidence and circumstances to 
be considered with the fact of the separation were: 
worn spots under three rivet holes from which it could 
be inferred there were three loose rivets in the wheel, 
the expert's opinion that that wear had taken place 
over a considerable length of time, that three loose rivets 
would cause an ultimate failure of the wheel, that the 
first indication of anything being wrong was the drop-
ping of the left rear end, the swerving of the truck to the 
left, the attempt to turn it to the right and its tipping 
over, that an automobile track at the scene swerved to 
the left out onto the shoulder of the road and back to 
the right, that the truck was practically new and had 
not been previ·ously damaged. All of this evidence and 
the circumstances surrounding the accident when con-
sidered with the fact of the separation of the spider 
and rim have probative value and tend to prove that 
the wheel was faulty, and the jury was entitled to con-
sider the fact of separation in its determination of the 
ultimate issue of whether or not the wheel was defective. 
This is not a case involving the rule announced in 
Morrisson v. Perry, 104 Utah 139, 122 P(2) 191, to the 
effect that the mere happening of an automobile colli-
10 
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sion gives rise to no presumption of negligence. This, 
on the contrary, is a singling out, by the trial court, of 
a vital part of appellant's evidence and a direction, as 
a matter of law, that it may not be considered by the 
jury in determining whether or not there was a defect 
in the wheel. The instruction amounts to not only a 
comment on the evidence but a direction to the jurors 
that they will decide the case as though the fact of 
the separation of the spider and rim were not in evi-
dence and not before them at all. 
To withdraw from the jury's consideration the fact 
of the separation of the spider and rim was to withdraw 
a vital and substantial link from the chain of circum-
stances, all of which, when considered together, proved 
that the wheel \Yas defectively manufactured. 
2. CAUSATION. 
The instruction not only removes the fact of separa-
tion of the rim and spider from the case on the iss1,1e 
of defective manufacture, but it also declares that the 
fact of such separation may not be considered by the 
jury on the question of whether it caused the truck to 
go out of control and over turn. 
If the fact of the separation is taken out of the 
case, what do we have left on the issue of causation~ 
That can best be illustrated by assuming that, instead 
of separating, the spider and rim remained intact and 
were found in an apparently sound condition after the 
accident. If the spider and rim had been found in an 
. apparently normal condition after the accident, could 
11 
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appellant have ever claimed the over turning of the 
truck was caused by the failure of the wheel~ The 
answer is obvious, no such claim could possibly have 
been made. 
Certainly the fact of the separation of the spider 
and rim was relevant on the issue of what caused the 
truck to over turn. Appellant testified that she was 
driving down a gravel r,oad at a normal rate of speed, 
and the first indication of an impending accident was 
that she felt the left rear end suddenly drop down, the 
truck swerve to the left, and when she tried to turn it 
back to the right, it tipped over (R. 122, 123, 127). 
After the accident the rim and spider were found in 
a separated condition (R. 63, 64, 65, 66, 152, 153, 164, 
165, 264, 265, 272). Take the fact of such separation 
from the jury, (as instruction No. 6 does) and a sub-
'stantial part of appellant's evidence as to what caused 
the truck to tip over has been thrown out and excluded 
from the consideration of the jury. 
That the evidence as to the separated condition of 
the rim, Exhibit "B", and the spider, Exhibit "A", 
was relevant and admissible see Kelly v. Huber Baking 
Co., 145 Md. 321, 125 A. 782, (evidence of condition of 
steering gear after accident held relevant and properly 
admitted); Curtin v. Benjamin, 305 Mass. 489, 26 
N.E. (2) 354, 129 A.L.R. 433, (condition of left front tire 
after accident held admissible to show point of impact); 
Hwpp Motor Company v. Wadsworth, 113 F(2) 827, 
(evidence that pitman arm was completely disconnected 
fr;om the ball stud after accident and other evidence as 
12 
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to wear on, and condition of, steering mechanism after 
accident was held substantial evidence that accident 
occurred by reason of defective steering mechanism); 
Rotche v. BHick Motor Co., 358 Ill. 5:27, 193 N.E. 529, 
(necessary implication of decision is that had proper 
foundation been laid as to condition of cotter pins in 
brake mechanism observed two weeks after accident, 
it would have been relevant and admissible on issue of 
defective manufacture and causation); Staples v. Spence, 
179 Ya. 359, 19 S.E. (2) 69, (photographs of automobiles 
immediately after accident admitted, but oral testimony 
as to condition of automobiles after accident excluded; 
held, error); Evansville Container Corporation v. Mc-
Donald, 132 F(2) 80, (condition of automobiles after 
accident admissible as means of determining fault) ; 
129 A.L.R. 438, (general rule that evidence as to condi-
tion of an automobile subsequent to an accident is 
admissible as a means of ascertaining the responsibility 
for the accident, where the evidence is not too remote 
from the time of the accident, and where it is shown that 
the condition of the automobile has not changed since 
the accident); Dixon v. ~wood, 81 N.H. 385, 125 A. 261, 
(condition of automobile after accident relevant on issue 
as to hmY accident occurred); General AI otors Corpora-
tion v. Johnson, 137 F(2) 320, evidence of condition of 
axle housing and transmission housing after accident, 
and evidence of wear on such parts that appeared after 
accident was held relevant and held sub:.;tantial evi-
dence that accident occurred by reason of faulty con-
~truction of truck) ; 65 C.J .S. Sec. 231, page 1046: 20 
13 
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Am. Jur. Sec. 272, page 260. 
We submit that the trial court, by withdrawing 
from the jury's consideration the fact of the separation 
of the spider and rim, committed prejudicial error. 
POINT 2. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
OPINION EVIDENCE OF. MR. ARTHUR HARRIS 
ON THE ULTIMATE FACT IN ISSUE. 
The trial court, over objection, permitted Mr. Arthur 
Harris to testify as to his conclusion on the ultimate fact 
in issue. In response to a question, * * * 
Q. "Do you have an opinion, Mr. Harris, as 
to what occurred to cause the separation of the 
spider and rim as represented by Exhibits "A" 
and "B"~" 
The trial court over objection permitted Mr. Harris 
to testify that in his opinion, "that the wheel was struck 
an extremely heavy blow by some object on the outer 
rim which first * * * caused the spider to distort and 
then shear off the rivets." (R. 362, 363) 
DeGroot v. Winters et al., 261 Mich. 660, 249 N.W. 
69, was a malpractice suit. A doctor for the plaintiff 
was permitted to testify that malpractice "did" pro-
duce the condition suffered by plaintiff. On appeal the 
Supreme Court held that on the ultimate issue of whether 
plaintiff's condition was or was not occasioned by mal-
practice, expert opinion testimony that malpractice 
"did" rather than "could" occasion the result was in-
competent because it invaded the province of the jury. 
The judgment for the plaintiff was reversed. 
14 
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In the case of Layton v. Cregan~ Mallory Co. Inc., 
265 Mich. 574, 25:2 N.W. 337, the court permitted a medi-
cal witness to answer the following question: ''Is the 
condition you found during all this time, in your opinion, 
caused by the injury she sustained in the accident, or 
by working on the farm~'' The court in reversing the 
judgment for the plaintiff held that this testimony in-
vaded the province of the jury, and its admission, over 
objection, constituted error. For a case to the same 
effect see Kenower v. Hotels, Statley Co., 124 F(2) at 
page 663. For a case not in point but announcing the 
general rule that an expert witness may not express his 
opinion on the ultimate fact in issue see Utah Copper Co. 
vs. Industrial Commission, 69 Utah 452, 256 P. 399. 
The rationale of the cases cited are to the effect 
·that an expert witness may express an opinion as to 
what "could" or "might" have caused a particular con-
dition, but he cannot be permitted to express an opinion 
that an alleged cause "was" the cause of or "did" cause 
the particular condition. Whether a certain cause did 
in fact produce a given condition is for the jury to 
decide and is not a matter upon which an expert may 
express an opinion.· See the excellent discussion of this 
problem in DeGroot v. Winters, supra, and the cases 
cited therein. 
In the case before this court, Mr. Arthur Harris, 
over objection, was permitted to testify that in his 
opinion the separation of the spider, Exhibit "A", and 
the rim, Exhibit "B ", "was" caused by an extremely 
heav~' blow striking the outer rim. He did not testify 
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that such a blow "could" have caused or "might" have 
caused the separation. Mr. Harris was asked for and 
expressed his opinion as to the ,cause of the separation 
of the specific wheel involved in this litigation. The ques-
tion was not hypothetical in form and was improper 
for that reason. 
We submit that admitting this testimony, over ob-
jection, was prejudicial error. 
POINT 3. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF MR. LOWELL G. 
FOUTS. 
There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether or 
not there was a track at the scene of the accident that 
went off the surface of the road on the east side thereof 
and over the edge of the shoulder. Mr. Stinnett testified 
there was (R. 257 to 260, 267 to 272). Mr. Milovich and 
Beverly Hooper testified they did not see one (R. 163, 
164, 107, 108, 109, 110). Appellant testified the truck 
never left the road ( R. 122, 127). 
Lowell G. Fouts, over objection, was permitted to 
testify, in substance, that Mr. Stinnett told him there was 
a track or mark that ran off the road and that Mr. 
Stinnett had shown him such a mark sometime aft~r 
the accident. Mr. Fouts further testified that he went 
to the scene of the accident in May, 1952, several months 
after the accident with Franklin Harris and the same 
mark was still evident (R. 400, 401, 402, 403). 
The only purpose for offering and admitting this 
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testin10ny was for the truth of the fact asserted by 
:Jir. Stinnett, na1nely, that such a 1nark going off the 
road in fact existed. 
\Ye submit the testimony was hearsay and the court 
erred in admitting it, and in refusing to strike it on 
motion of the appellant. 
POINT 4. 
THE TRI~\L COURT ERRED IN ADI\liTTING 
THE 8PECULATIVE TESTIMONY OF 
~IR. ARTHUR H.._\RRIS. 
The trial court, over objection that the testimony 
was speculative, permitted _Mr. Arthur Harris to testify 
that if the left rear wheel of the truck struck a boulder 
of any size or type as shown in Exhibit '' 1 '' and there 
was some side motion to the truck that that would be 
enough force t~ cause the shearing of the rivets and 
the separation of the spider, Exhibit "A", and the rim, 
Exhibit • 'B ", provided the boulder was partially buried 
so that there would be resistance to its sliding (R. 
393, 394). 
There "·as no assumption made at all as to the speed 
of the truck at the time of hitting such a boulder. There 
was no evidence in the record at all that any boulders 
of any size were partially buried. There was no evidence 
that there were any boulders either burie(l or otherwise 
in or near the track which Mr. Stinnett said went 
off the road. 
The testimony was admitted, over objection, and 
the trial court refused, on motion of appellant, to strike 
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it from the record. Mr. Harris was permitted to specu-
late and give his conjectural views on a vital issue in 
the case, namely, what ,caused the accident. We submit 
the admission of the testimony and the refusal to 
grant appellant's motion to strike was prejudicial error. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McBROOM & HANNI and 
E. R. MILLER, JR., 
Attorneys for Appellwnt. 
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